

DDI 2/25-74

11 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Comment on the Memorandum "The State of
Soviet Analysis in CIA"

The memo makes some misinformed assertions, dispenses some overly-casual generalizations, and tends in places to the platitudinous-superficial. It is, at the same time, one-sided in its concentration on OPR's Soviet effort. I would note, too, that many of the issues raised are by no means breaking the surface for the first time here. Having said this, I would agree that they are for the most part legitimate and vital issues. I would like to see some of these exposed even more fully. Some of the points touched on -- and I have in mind particularly the reference to the problem of determining intentions and predicting behavior -- are central to the whole business of intelligence analysis, not just in the Soviet area. I think all levels of the Agency would profit greatly from a close, hard look at this whole question. We will be trying to take at least one step in this direction in an OPR paper scheduled later this year on the subject of defining Soviet "intentions" in the context of detente.

The issue of "cross-fertilization" -- and what is really a part of the larger issue: how to allow play for informed and reasoned dissent -- is still another which is of concern across the whole spectrum of intelligence analysis. I do not recall the time when we have not felt uneasy about our deficiencies in this area and sensed that ways could be found to cure some of them. At the same time, I do not think it helps much simply to say that there is not enough cross-fertilization. It is almost by definition something there is never enough of; who could possibly set himself

25X1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

against the idea that there should be more of it? But it is not a measurable commodity; it is an abstraction, and judgments as to how much it is in short supply are necessarily highly subjective.

My own judgment is that the notion that it is at present seriously lacking is exaggerated. There is, indeed, a great deal of compartmentation and specialization within the Agency. To some extent this is necessary and unavoidable. At the same time, we have many mechanisms for insuring and even requiring an exchange of views, though these admittedly are not always maintained in perfect order. The basic one is the coordination and consultation process, which all intelligence end products go through. Perhaps for many analysts this is more a burdensome routine than anything else, but it is nonetheless a regular form of opinion exchange. There are also numerous forums for multilateral exchange, finished intelligence and some not. It should also be pointed out that there is an active informal network of Soviet analysts in OCI, OPR, FBIS, OER, OSR, DDO/SB, CRS, INR and DIA that is in constant communication on Soviet developments. There are, in addition, the many programs of the Office of Training which bring together Agency people, some of them in the status of students and others as guest lecturers, for the discussion of a whole range of substantive and managerial topics. And, finally, the opinions of others, expressed in the form of published reports, are generally available to everyone.

Unquestionably, bureaucratic barriers and gaps between disciplines within the Agency remain. The memo proposes as one way of reducing this inherent problem a policy of increased rotation between components. This, too, is a notion which has come up again and again over the years. It is hard to object to it in principle, and, of course, there are quite a good number of rotations now occurring, in and from OCI, for example. It will certainly be desirable to devise a means of allowing people to take rotational assignments in OPR when it appears that they can and want to do a piece of research tailored to OPR's needs. (Lew Lapham, by the way, will shortly be sending along his thoughts on your suggestions in this regard.) But there are rotations and rotations. I believe that -- speaking of the situation as I see it in

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

this Directorate -- there might be as many drawbacks as benefits to an extensive, systematized program of rotation. For one thing, political specialists are, for the most part, political specialists and not economic experts (and vice versa) because that is where their interests and talents lie. The great majority of the best of them want it that way. To take an analyst out of OCI, say, and assign him to one of the specialized working components of OER, for a longish period of time will in many cases, especially if the analyst is not keen for such experience, produce negligible results in terms of expanding his horizons, and at the same time involve no little cost in terms of his time and the host office's time. I could, however, foresee benefits resulting from an arrangement under which, for example, an experienced political analyst was assigned to the Office of the Director of Economic Research and under his auspices given wide familiarization with the sources, methods of analysis and personnel of the office as a whole, over a period of something like 3 to 6 months. External training in other disciplines, either via governmental or academic programs, is another useful route. In either case, however, the number of people who can be accommodated is limited by budgetary and practical considerations.

This suggests a further point, an important one I believe, and one which is neglected in the memo. This is that there are considerable possibilities for broadening our thinking and sharpening our insights available to us outside the Agency. This is not to depreciate the expertise contained within our walls but to say that there is a rich external fund which, I suspect, we are not making as much use of as we should. In the first place, this means no more than staying abreast of the academic literature in our various fields of interest. But we should continue to place value on establishing and expanding direct contacts with academic specialists, on both a multilateral and bilateral basis. Attendance at professional conferences is one way. Still another is the specially organized informal seminar bringing academics and Agency people together periodically for discussions focused on a particular subject or paper. I should point out, however, that this device, valuable as it is, needs to be used selectively because, security considerations apart, there is always the danger that we could wear out our welcome in the academic community.

I take more seriously than the observations about cross-fertilization in general the complaint about the impediments to flexible and original thinking. It is a longstanding problem, but one which, to my knowledge, has never been attacked in earnest. The analytical environment does not in fact encourage the rethinking of established wisdoms and comfortable verities. To some extent this lack is in the nature of the bureaucratic beast, and of life in an organized community with its group pressures, fear of the consequences of isolation and error, etc. And, as is well known, coordination, though it discourages wild swings and helps to cull out the merely eccentric, also inexorably drives opinion toward the well-trodden middle ground. Thought might perhaps be given to keeping formal, full-dress coordination -- which strictly speaking means equal rights for the originator and the commentator -- to a minimum and allowing more room for the kind of informed and responsible consultation which academic scholars, by and large, practice among themselves. There is also some appeal in a notion which has been discussed recently within the Agency -- the notion of some form of "devil's advocacy," not too formal and institutionalized, but a device or even just a shared attitude that would help to insure that novel ideas and unconventional opinions get a fair hearing. In any case, the subject is worth further thought.

I am also in sympathy with the suggestion that our analytical, as opposed to our managerial, resources sometimes, in the end, are treated as our least prized assets. This is not to say that once a Sovietologist or Sinologist always a Sovietologist or Sinologist. Some people with experience in these fields move to other things, sometimes simply because their interests and enthusiasms have shifted. But where this is not the case and where people have demonstrated their capacities for top-flight intelligence analysis, there ought to be ways of insuring that they continue to be rewarded commensurately. It is Directorate policy to promote our best analysts to GS-15 and we have done so where possible. Personnel ceilings and grade restrictions have not permitted as many such senior analyst jobs as we would like, but the opportunity is clearly there. Furthermore, our branches and divisions are small and the chiefs of these organizations are intimately involved in the analytical process often doing the original drafting of major intelligence items. In effect,

our branch chiefs are senior analysts devoting the overwhelming amount of their time to substantive matters. But needless to say, since there are only so many of the higher grades to go around, any attempt to make these more widely available to substantive personnel would ultimately entail reduction of administrative-managerial and staff positions.

Over the years I have found that good analysts come to us in a variety of disguises, some as Ph.D's, some as BA's. Some of these, usually those who gravitate to Soviet foreign affairs, have the journalist temperament and itchy feet and like to be where the most action is. It is these people we must persuade to tarry a little. Others wish to dig out their little specialist hole and bury themselves in it. It is these we must persuade to spend some time in the outside world occasionally. I think we need both kinds and both new and old blood, where possible in a state of creative tension.

Finally, some comments on the references to OPR, its objectives and reflexes. I take the observations about the relevance of its work program to be largely gratuitous. In any case, they are too off-handed to be helpful. We are all I think keenly aware of the necessity of making and keeping the research effort relevant. Neither I nor the members of OPR foresee their becoming a community of bearded monks in dusty cassocks sitting atop their own Mt. Athos. Nor do I or they want to slip into the business of, as one member of OPR put it, churning out Ph.D theses with SECRET stamps on them. But, at this stage, I have no misgivings on that score.

As for the participation of OPR's experts in Agency-wide or interagency enterprises (NIEs, NSSDMs, etc.), it is of course untrue to imply, as the memo does, that this does not occur. How much is desirable, at this point in the quite short life of the office, is a matter of judgment. I would expect this aspect of its work to grow, especially since the staff that has been assembled possesses considerable versatility. We will also want to provide opportunities for the staff members to express their thoughts from time to time in forms other than the full-blown research report.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

But the creation of OPR was the result of a belief that there was a gap to be filled in the area of research in depth. Until it has been demonstrated that this is not the case -- and eight months have hardly been enough to do that -- I am convinced it would be a mistake to begin thinking about changing course. It would especially be a mistake to send OPR down the road of current support, including making regular contributions to NID. While there can be no precise delimitation of the sphere of current intelligence, and OPR must also concern itself with the immediate and the topical, not just the historical or futuristic, to follow such a course would be to blur the legitimate distinctions between the missions of OCI and OPR beyond recognition. I would note here, parenthetically, that I find it curious that the author, perhaps inadvertently, at no point in his memo acknowledges that OCI, like OPR, is the home base for a body of well-trained and experienced Soviet experts.



25X1

PAUL V. WALSH

Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

(1 - DDI

1 - D/OPR

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TAB

DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip

Executive Registry
77-2058

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T		✓	14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D-DCI/C		✓	18			
9	D-DCI/NIO		✓	19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE _____

Date

Remarks:

Some stimulating
questions and ideas
re Soviet Analysis —
with some non-Soviet
implications — Would
appreciate your comments

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

2051-74

2 July 1974

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA .

1. A memorandum addressing a subject as broad as the status of Sovietology in CIA easily could have the effectiveness of a shotgun at long range, that is, cover the target broadly but to no effect. To forestall that possibility, this memorandum will focus on just three aspects of the analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA--the appropriate use of the small group of trained Sovietologists, bureaucratic barriers to better analysis, and the current direction of the Office of Political Research.*

2. Analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA falls primarily into three broad categories--economic, military and political. Because intelligence sources and methods are particularly well-suited to gathering information on Soviet economic and military performance and capabilities, Intelligence analysts in these areas currently are doing rather well in providing the policymaker with accurate and useful information.

3. Political analysis of Soviet affairs, on the other hand, is both more subjective and more difficult. The political analyst is called upon (a) to analyze and explain past events, and (b) to predict Soviet intentions. The first task is being performed well by Intelligence specialists; analytical papers of this type repeatedly have received compliments from the highest levels of the government. It is the second or predictive task, however, that holds greatest interest for the policymaker. And it is precisely in this task that political analysts face the most difficult obstacles and possess the fewest assets. Much of the problem is inherent in the thankless task of trying to predict the intentions of any political leader or group of leaders, a problem compounded many times over when dealing with a closed and culturally dissimilar society such as that of the Soviet Union.

*This memorandum addresses only the topic of Soviet analysis, but it should be evident that the problems and related recommendations would probably be similar in other areas.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

-2-

SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA

4. While many of the problems affecting the quality of Intelligence analysis of Soviet intentions are not susceptible to resolution or even diminution by Intelligence managers, there are at least three that could be remedied or at least ameliorated:

a. Analysts with experience and specialized training in Soviet politics and history are often "promoted" out of analytical positions, thus squandering an important Intelligence asset.

b. Necessary bureaucratic divisions of labor (OER, OSR, OPR) have had the effect of encouraging narrow perspective on the part of specialists in each area; few analysts are knowledgeable in areas of Soviet affairs beyond their own.

c. The relatively small group of Soviet analysts whose experience and talent resulted in their selection for OPR are not being employed on short or near term projects of important policy interest such as NSSM/NSDM responses, NIEs, policy support memoranda, and even major analytical articles for the NID.

5. The following recommendations may prove helpful in coming to grips with the above problems.

a. Experienced and trained Soviet analysts should be assigned with care and provided with incentives to remain "on the line," that is, not forced to move out of analysis or substance to obtain promotions or job satisfaction. It is important not only that career Soviet specialists have the opportunity to rise to Grade 15, but also that psychic incentives be further developed to reinforce the analyst's self-esteem and job satisfaction and thence contentment to remain an analyst. Such incentives should also be developed so as to encourage originality of thought, analytical imagination, and greater cross-fertilization of ideas. The quality of analysis clearly is diminished by the simple fact that the analyst sitting at his desk day in, day out becomes complacent, his perspective narrow, and his perceptions stale.

b. Arrangements should be made for the rotation of individual Soviet analysts from one office to another (i.e. OPR to OER, OSR to OPR, etc.) on a regular though limited basis. Assignments of six months to a year would not only allow, say, a political analyst to gain useful knowledge about Soviet strategic programs or the Soviet

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA

economy, but would also bring a new perspective to the work of analysts in those areas. It seems indisputable that such cross-fertilization would improve the analysis of all and at the same time develop contacts for future consultation among Soviet specialists in different areas.

c. OPR appears to be moving in the direction of becoming another Special Research Staff (recently deceased), programming long term research projects on topics often not relevant to current policy issues. A situation in which our best Sovietologists have little or no role in current or near term support is unsatisfactory and a misapplication of Intelligence resources. Consideration should be given to organizing OPR's Soviet staff so as to derive maximum benefit from the analysts' expertise. The Staff, small though it is, should be organized so that analysts are assigned to research projects (such as those currently programmed), to near term projects (NSSMs/NSDMs, NIEs, etc.) and to current support (policy support memoranda for the Secretary of State and NSC Staff, preparation of analytical articles for the NID, and so forth). Thus, in each of these important areas where Intelligence is asked to make contributions, its best qualified Soviet experts will have focused on the problem.

6. Finally, it may come as a surprising and dismaying fact that the number of trained and experienced Soviet analysts is probably too small to perform all of the important tasks noted above. Managers should realize that there is a need for career Sovietologists--especially those skilled in Soviet internal affairs--and that little effort is being devoted either to recruiting them from the academe or to selecting talented analysts in other areas of the Agency for formal (i.e. not just "on-the-job") training in Soviet affairs.

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director
for Intelligence

Paul:

This memorandum, per your request,
reflects the joint views of []
and [] If you would like any
revisions of it please let us know.

*Also attached is a []
memo--with
quite different views!*

11 July 74
(DATE)

FORM NO.
1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OCI
D/OPR

Mr. Walsh would like [] and
[] to provide for his signature
a response to the attached anonymous memo to
Mr. Colby.

Mr. Walsh would like a response by 11 July.

If there is no consensus between [] and
[] independent comments would be appropriate.

Thanks,

[]
O/DDI

5 July 1974
(DATE)

FORM NO.
1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: PVW

Mr. Colby would like comments on the attached memo, which, according to [] was done for the DCI by an author who, for personal reasons, prefers to remain anonymous.

What action?

Give to []

Other?

How about an 11 July deadline? OK

I will send copies to OCI, OSR, OPR, and

OER. done

[]
5 July 1974
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

NIO# 1533-74

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence



DATE: 11 July 1974

TO: Mr. Colby

SUBJECT: Comments on "The State of Soviet
Analysis in CIA"

Copies to:

Mr. Colby
Gen. Walters
Mr. Walsh
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

25X1

SECRET

11 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Comments on "The State of Soviet
Analysis in CIA"

1. This is obviously a knowledgeable and thoughtful analysis. I will address myself to its three points in turn.
2. On the promotion of experienced analysts out of production and into administration. From my experience in OCI, I would think that this is not a more serious problem in the Soviet field than in any other. Nor can I think of more than a small handful of Soviet analysts who have been promoted out of production. Perhaps the problem is that analysts believe that only by going the supervisory route -- and getting onto that track early -- can they reach GS-15. By and large, they would be right in this.
3. As for self-esteem and job satisfaction, this can be promoted by contact with other agencies, exchanges with academicians, participation in symposia, and trips to the USSR. For the most part, this is a matter for initiative by the analysts, but doubtless managers could promote this kind of activity more steadily than they do.
4. On bureaucratic divisions. Amen. There is analyst resistance to overcome here; I had to twist arms to get OCI analysts to take SALT-related tours in OSR. There will never be any volunteers for transfer between OCI and OER. One- or two-year rotational tours in neighboring production offices should be imposed on a small, trial-basis scale.
5. On the role of OPR. This is a toughie. The author makes a valid case for the engagement of OPR's Soviet analysts in direct policy-support work. As an NIO responsible for getting policy-support work done, I have frequent occasion to look greedily in their direction. And it would be unhealthy if there grew up in OPR an ivory-tower atmosphere of non-involvement equal to that which came to characterize SRS. On the other hand:

25X1

SECRET


SECRET

-- the degree of involvement which the author proposes could quickly consume all OPR's Soviet resources;

-- OPR represents the Agency's first chance to conduct a sustained, broad-gauged program of political research on the USSR; there are important, long-range, researchable questions which have never been systematically addressed (and it should be understood that some of the research is basic and, while necessary, would not result in formal publication);

-- both OER and then OSR had to make a lengthy investment in basic research before they had anything unique and useful to say to policymakers; OPR does not need as long an initial investment period, but it does need one.




I would therefore recommend an OPR involvement in policy-support work which starts small and grows gradually over the next two years. This would provide some direct payoff and would help to set the right intra-office climate, but would reserve the bulk of analytic resources for investments directed at later payoffs. Any projects which represented neither policy support or research investments should be eliminated. After two years of a gradually changing balance, review and new decisions would be called for.



25X1

NIO/USSR

Distribution:

Mr. Colby
Gen. Walters
Mr. Walsh
Mr. 
Mr. 
Mr. 
ER
NIO/RI
NIO/USSR/Chron

25X1

SECRET

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 10 July 1974
TO: Acting Director <i>OCI</i> <i>April</i>		
ROOM NO. 7F24	BUILDING Hqs <i>file OPR</i>	
REMARKS: <p><i>This was the memo I prepared for [redacted] It has since been incorporated into another memo along with [redacted] where I will send you the second memo when I get it.</i></p>		
FROM: CD/USSR-EE Division		
ROOM NO. 7G25	BUILDING Hqs	[redacted]
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.		

25X1

25X1

25X1

10 July 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Comment on the Memorandum "The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA"

There are two disquieting things about this memorandum. One is the recommendation that OPR devote more of its attention to near term projects, to current policy support and to the preparation of analytical articles for the NID. "Thus in each of these important areas (along with research projects) when intelligence is asked to make contributions, its best qualified Soviet experts will have focused on the problem." The second disquieting thing, perhaps flowing from the first, is that nowhere in the memorandum is the existence of an OCI admitted.

On the first point, I was not consulted on the formation of OPR or its charter and there is no reason why I should have been. But, I did agree with the idea that we should do more relevant, policy oriented, basic research. I still do. I presume that the DCI and DDI still feel that way. If they do not and the desire is to put more people from OPR on current problems so be it. I am sure that we in this office could work well with them, divide the load, interact (as indeed we do now) and continue to produce a good current product. I resent, however, the implication that the Soviet experts in OPR are "best qualified" to do this current support work. I do not think they are any more qualified than the people we have here. Not all the Soviet experts in the Agency joined OPR. In fact there were few who did from OCI, OSR, OER, FBIS, and DDP for a variety of reasons. OPR in my judgment is well staffed but it is far from being the only reservoir of Soviet talent in the Agency.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

On the second point of disquietude I may be overreacting. It could have been sheer inadvertence on the author's part that OCI was not mentioned. Yet I find it curious that OER and OSR come in for their share of attention. The implication seems to be that OCI is not doing its job very well if it is necessary to divert another office from its assigned task to help out. Here I think we would welcome some concrete criticism and advice and probably profit from it.

As far as the rest of the memorandum is concerned commenting further is like trying to nail a custard pie to the wall. The generalities are certainly all true but the irritating part of it is that they somehow seem to be posed as fresh discoveries. In all seriousness (leaving aside my own views) I must say these points have been recognized by all the supervisors I have had since 1948. I would like to think that we are alert to the problems posed in para 4a and 4b and that we do implement the recommendations in para 5a and 5b. I am attaching a list of our analysts, their qualifications, their time on the job and the outside experience they have enjoyed.

also proud of our record for obtaining career education awards for our analysts.

I do not think it necessary to dwell too much on the rotational matter. It should continue to be encouraged. Seven of our analysts have already served in OSR when the [redacted] staff was located there. This fall an officer from SB/DDO will join us for a year. One is now serving as assistant NIO for the USSR, another on the NSC staff and a third is to leave for a tour in INR shortly. Also, I thought I would never have anything good to say about coordination but I must say it does discourage "narrow perspective." It should also be pointed out that there is a very healthy unofficial network of Soviet analysts in OCI, FBIS, OER, OSR, DDO/SB, CRS, INR and DIA that is in constant communication on Soviet developments.

Over the years I have found that good analysts come to us in a variety of disguises, some as PhD's, some as BAs. Some of these, usually those who gravitate to Soviet foreign affairs, have the journalist temperament and itchy feet and like to be where the most action is. It is these people we must persuade to tarry a little. Others wish to dig out their little specialist hole and bury themselves in it. It is these we must

persuade to spend some time in the outside world occasionally.
I think we need both kinds and both new and old blood, where
possible in a state of creative tension.



25X1

Chief, USSR & Eastern European Division
Office of Current Intelligence

Attachment: as stated above


Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - AD/OCI

1 - 

1 - USSR-EE Division Chrono

CCI/USSR-EE Div:  (10 Jul 74)

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/09/29 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000600040010-4